Toward a Rational Society: Part IV – Examples

Torture

The recent sheepishness on the part of the Obama Administration to push for prosecutions for those who authorized and carried out Bush Administration torture policies raises an issue for rational morality:  if emotion should not factor into moral considerations, can the harsh treatment detailed in the ‘torture memos’ be considered immoral if, as is claimed in the memos, the treatment left no lasting physical damage?

First, I need to expand on the issue of emotion.  I stated earlier that a moral system cannot take emotional results into account, since morality tells us how to act in spite of any emotional state we might be in.  Pain, strictly speaking, isn’t an emotion.  If I get slapped in the face, it hurts.  This response is not emotional, but biological.  Pain is no more an emotion than bitter is an emotion.  If is a physical sensation that, for all intents and purposes, we can consider to be universal.  ‘Emotional pain’ is not in fact pain, but rather a linguistic representation of the feeling we get when suffering from negative emotion. Continue reading…

Toward a Rational Society: Part III – Foresight

We cannot be held morally responsible for the highly improbable. Where we must own up to our complicity in decline is in those instances in which we caused the decline to be probable, more probable or even likely, whether directly or through the foreseeable acts of others, rational or irrational, moral or immoral. [...]

Toward a Rational Society: Part II – Contexts

All of my actions have consequences. Some of those might effect only an individual. Should I read Christopher Moore tonight, or James Gleick? It’s hard to conceive of how anyone except myself would be affected by this decision. But decisions that affect only a single individual are actually few and far between. What if my earlier question had been, “Should I watch Chuck tonight, or House?” Now my decision influences other people, namely those who produce and broadcast the shows, even if it is to only a minuscule degree. [...]